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10(b) or Not 10(b): Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver
Securities enjoy the distinction of being perhaps the most
disingenuously named product available.' From the time of their
creation,2 through the great crash of 1929, up until the savings and
loan debacle of the 1980s, securities have not been particularly
"secure."3 In the wake of the largely unregulated speculation leading
up to the crash of 1929, the federal government implemented a
comprehensive set of disclosure regulations that sought, by minimizing
the risk of inaccurate information, to limit the risk undertaken by
investors to that risk inherent in the investment instrument itself.4
Most significantly, this regulation included the Securities Act of 1933,
which regulates initial offerings of stock to the public,5 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which purports to regulate most
other aspects of the sale and resale of securities.
6
1. "Security" means:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, col-
lateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights ... or,
in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any
certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of
the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988). For further background on the modem
statutory definition of a security, see Gary S. Rosin, Historical Perspectives on the
Definition of a Security, 28 S. TEX. L. REv. 575 passim (1987).
2. While the origins of secured transactions are obscured by the mists of time, they
are known to have been a feature of commerce in Greco-Roman antiquity. See JULES
TOUTAIN, THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE ANCIENT WORLD 74 (1930) (citing 2 CHARLES
DAREMBERG, ET AL:, DICrIONNAIRE DES ANTIQUITIES GRECQUES ET ROMAINES 1214
(Paris, Librairie Hachette, 1896)).
3. Securities markets are not exempt from the effects of human frailties that
influence other commercial transactions. "[T]he problems at which modem securities
regulation is directed are as old as the cupidity of sellers and the gullibility of buyers."
Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3 (1951).
4. THoMAs L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2, at 6-9 (2d ed.
1990 & Supp. 1994) (Practitioner's ed.).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77bbbb (1988) (hereinafter referred to as the 1933 Act).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78111 (1988) (hereinafter referred to as the 1934 Act).
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While these Acts provide explicitly for various means of enfor-
cement,7 they have also been the source of private remedies implied
by the judiciary. These implied remedies have become potent
weapons for both private and state plaintiffs seeking to redress
grievances arising from transactions in the securities marketplace.8
In light of both the clear utility of implied remedies and their
well-established place in the securities enforcement arsenal, the
United States Supreme Court's recent holding in Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver9 is surprising and troubling.
In Central Bank, the Court struck down the ability of a private
plaintiff to maintain an action under Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) rule 10b-5"° against those persons alleged to have
aided and abetted persons engaging in "manipulative and deceptive"
practices as defined by rule 10b-5." This decision may well serve as
a turning point, not only in the Court's securities jurisprudence, but
in its entire approach to statutory construction.
At issue in Central Bank was whether or not a private action
could be maintained against one alleged to have aided and abetted in
the violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,12 a question that the Court had twice before declined to
decide. 3 The Court in Central Bank held that such an action could
7. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988) (providing for civil liability on account of false
registration statements); 15 U.S.C. § 771(1988) (mandating civil penalties for violations of
rules governing securities prospectuses and solicitations).
8. For example, 15% of the SEC's 1992 civil enforcement actions contained claims
of aiding and abetting. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114
S. Ct. 1439, 1460 n.11 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
11. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455 ("[W]e hold that a private plaintiff may not
maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).").
12. Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 reads, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) (corresponds to Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, title
I, § 10, 48 Stat. 991).
13. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191 n.7 (1976) ("[W]e need not
consider whether civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and
the Rule."); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983) ("While
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not be maintained, basing its holding on a strictly literalist reading of
the statute at issue.'4 In refusing to uphold the existence of an
implied cause of action, the court overturned the rule of law as it
existed in all federal appellate circuits.'" In a dissent joined by three
Justices, Justice Stevens noted this departure and made clear that the
rationale of the court sets an unsettling precedent and poses a
significant threat to other entrenched forms of secondary liability.6
This Note first discusses the facts of Central Bank and examines
the reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions." It then
charts the evolution of the implied remedy under rule 10b-5 and
outlines the development of aiding and abetting liability.18 Next, the
Note analyzes Central Bank's decision to eliminate aiding and abetting
liability'--an activist result paradoxically supported by the opinion's
"textualist" rationale-and explores its ramifications. The Note then
concludes that, while the Court's action will initially lead to a
reduction in the number of prosecutions for secondary liability, lower
courts, wary of treading on the uncertain terrain of implied federal
remedies, will likely expand their usage of state law aider-abettor
liability.
20
Petitioner Central Bank of Denver was the indenture trustee2'
several Courts of Appeals have permitted aider-and-abettor liability[,] ... we specifically
reserved this issue in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.").
14. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446. ("[Tlhe text of the statute controls our
decision.").
15. Id at 1456 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing federal circuit court opinions
accepting private aider-abettor liability).
16. Id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Secondary liability is a term of art, and as
Professor Fischel noted:
[T]he distinction between primary and secondary liability is essential. Secondary
liability under the securities laws is used to describe the judicially implied civil
liability which has been imposed on defendants who have not themselves violated
the express prohibition of the securities statute at issue, but who have some
relationship with the primary wrongdoer. Courts have imposed this type of
liability on defendants who aid-abet, conspire with, or employ a defendant who
does violate the express prohibition of a statute.
Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69
CAL. L. REV. 80, 80 n.4 (1981).
17. See infra notes 21-91 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 92-180 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 181-210 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 210-217 and accompanying text.
21. An indenture is "a written agreement under which bonds and debentures are
issued2l.12
.... [An indenture can be a] mortgage [or] deed of trust... under which there is
outstanding a security.., constituting a claim against the debtor, a claim secured by a lien
on any of the debtor's property." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 770 (6th ed. 1990). An
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for a public building authority's two bond issues.' The Colorado
Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority issued the bonds in
1986 to finance public improvements in a proposed commercial and
residential development, Stetson Hills.' The Authority issued a
total of $26 million in bonds, in turn secured by landowner assessment
liens.24 The 1986 bond issue covered roughly 250 acres, and the 1988
bond issue covered about 272 acres.O The bond covenants mandat-
ed that the "land subject to the liens be worth at least 160% of the
bonds' outstanding principal and interest., 26 Moreover, the bond
covenants required the developer, AmWest Development, to submit
a report to Central Bank annually, proving that the "160% test" was
being met 7  In January 1988, in compliance with its obligation,
AmWest gave to Central Bank both an "updated" appraisal of the
land securing the 1986 bonds and a valuation of the land securing the
1988 bonds.' Central Bank initially rejected the updated appraisal
because the appraiser had combined the property securing both the
1986 and the 1988 bonds.29 Upon their being properly separated,
however, it became clear that the land values given for the property
securing both bond issues had not changed significantly in the two
years since the 1986 appraisal." The senior underwriter of the 1986
bonds wrote to Central Bank, expressing concern about Central
Bank's reliance on an appraisal that was almost a year and a half old,
especially in light of the contemporary fall in property values in the
Colorado Springs area.31
Central Bank's "in-house" appraiser was called in to examine the
1988 appraisal, and he concurred with the underwriter's concern that
the values given were excessive in light of the real estate market.
3 2
In addition, he questioned the methodology used to prepare the
indenture trustee is the "person or institution named in a trust indenture and charged with
holding legal title to the trust property and with carrying out the terms of the indenture."
Id.







29. First Interstate Bank of Denver v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 894 nA (10th Cir. 1992),
rev'd sub nom. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439
(1994).
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appraisal, 3 and recommended that an independent appraiser be
engaged to study the 1988 appraisal?4 Central Bank, after proposing
such a review to AmWest, ultimately acquiesced to the entreaties of
the developer and delayed an outside, independent reappraisal of the
land securing the bonds until the end of the year, after the issuance
of a second series of bonds in June 198805 Before completion of the
independent review of the appraisal, the public building authority
defaulted on the 1988 bonds, and respondents First Interstate Bank
of Denver, N.A. and Jack Naber-who between them held $2.1
million worth of the 1988 bonds-filed suit against the building
authority, the underwriters, the developer, and the indenture
trustee.36  Their complaint "alleged that the Authority, the
underwriter defendants, and [an] AmWest director had violated
section 10(b)" of the 1934 Act. 7 The action against Central Bank
was premised on SEC Rule 10b-5,38 and alleged that the bank's
conduct in agreeing to defer the reassessment exposed the bank to
secondary liability under section 10(b) for aiding and abetting
securities fraud. 9 The District Court for the District of Colorado
granted summary judgment to Central Bank.40 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that
summary judgment had been erroneously granted because there was
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Central Bank, by not
33. Pring, 969 F.2d at 893 n.4.




38. See id. at 1445. Rule 10b-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
39. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1443. See generally David S. Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari
Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597 (1972) (offering the
seminal survey of secondary liability under the securities laws).
40. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1443.
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insisting upon an immediate independent appraisal, had "substantially
assisted"'" the parties accused of the primary violation of section
10(b).!
2
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Central Bank initially asserted
that it had not breached any duty owed to the purchasers of the
bonds for which it served as indenture trustee, and that mere
recklessness would not satisfy the scienter requirement for aiding and
abetting liability. 3 The Court, in granting certiorari, chose not to
hear the "breach of duty" question and instead commanded the
parties to brief the issue of "[w]hether there is an implied private
right of action for aiding and abetting violations of section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5. '
Although the appeals court,45 and indeed the petitioner-bank,46 had
no doubt as to the viability of such a cause of action, the Court's sua
sponte command that the parties brief the question of section 10(b)
aiding and abetting liability indicated that the issue was not so clear.
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision, holding
that a private plaintiff may not bring an aiding and abetting action
under section 10(b).47 In delivering the opinion of the majority,4"
Justice Kennedy first acknowledged that such lawsuits had indeed
been viable in the federal courts,4 9 beginning with Brennan v.
Midwestern Life Insurance Co."0 in 1966. However, the majority
continued, the propriety of these actions began to fall into question
only ten years later, with the Court's holdings in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelde5  and Santa Fe Industries v. Green,2 both of which
41. See infra note 122 and accompanying text (describing elements of § 10(b) aiding
and abetting action).
42. First Interstate Bank of Denver v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 904-05 (10th Cir. 1992),
rev'd sub nom. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439
(1994).
43. Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Defendant-Appellant at i, Central Bank (No.
92-854), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993) (mem.).
44. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interest Bank of Denver, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993)
(mem.) (granting the petition for certiorari).
45. See Pring, 969 F.2d at 898.
46. Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Defendant-Appellant, Central Bank, 114 S. Ct.
1439 (1994) (No. 92-854).
47. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
48. Id. at 1442. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas
joined the majority opinion. Id.
49. Id. at 1444.
50. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970).
51. 425 U.S. 185,199-201 (1976) (holding that negligence will not suffice to meet the
"scienter" requirement of liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, because statutory
1244 [Vol. 73
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closely scrutinized the boundaries of the conduct proscribed by section
10(b).' Lower federal courts, according to Justice Kennedy, had
since that time been doubtful as to the legitimacy of aiding and
abetting liability
5 4
The Court canvassed its decisions concerning section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 5  Justice Kennedy found that in those cases the Court
had determined two primary issues: (1) the scope of conduct
prohibited by section 10(b);56 and (2) the proper elements of the
private liability scheme once a violation of the statute has been
established.' Because section 10(b) grants no express private right
of action and thus provides no commands concerning the elements of
a private liability scheme, the Court has answered questions concer-
ning the elements of the private liability scheme by inferring "how the
1934 Congress would have addressed the issue[s] had the 10b-5 action
been included as an express provision in the 1934 act."5 8  The
majority acknowledged that section 10(b), the "general antifraud
provision of the 1934 Act," is the most prominent source of implied
private rights of action. 9
Although the proper elements of the liability scheme are subject
to greater judicial manipulation when they are implied rather than
express, Justice Kennedy stated that the Court has operated under far
more significant restraints in determining the scope of conduct
proscribed by section 10(b). Prior precedent inevitably leads to the
determination that "the text of the statute controls our decision,"'
language such as "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance" indicates concern with
regulating conduct far more willful than mere negligence).
52. 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) (holding that conduct not "manipulative" or
"deceptive" falls outside the purview of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
53. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1444.
54. Id. at 1445-55 (citing as examples of this doubt Little v. Valley National Bank of
Arizona, 650 F.2d 218, 220 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (indicating that the "status of aiding and
abetting as a basis for liability under the securities laws [was] in some doubt") and Benoay
v. Decker, 517 F. Supp. 490,495, affd, 735 F.2d 1363 (6th Cir. 1984) ("[It is] doubtful that
a claim for 'aiding and abetting' ... will continue to exist under § 10(b).")).
55. Id.
56. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085,2092 (1993)
(holding that a right of contribution may be implied in 10b-5 actions); Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind' Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359 (1991) (holding that an action
implied under § 10(b) should be governed by statute of limitations provision found in the
Act from which it is implied, rather than by state law borrowing principles).
58. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446 (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers
Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2090 (1993)).
59. Id. at 1445.
60. Id. at 1446.
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and that text, he concluded, does not mention aider and abettor
liability.
61
Moreover, the majority asserted, such strict literalist construction
is consistent with the Court's decisions regarding provisions of
securities legislation other than 10(b).62 In a not-so-subtle bit of
foreshadowing, the majority noted that the absence of any legislative
language concerning aiding and abetting "bode[d] ill for respon-
dents."' Both respondents and the Securities and Exchange
Commission-which filed an amicus curiae brief--"hinted" that the
"directly or indirectly" language of section 10(b) should be read to
include aiding and abetting liability.'  The Court rejected this
argument, pointing out that those federal courts imposing aiding and
abetting liability have not done so in reliance on that statutory
language and that none of the other occurrences of the phrase
"directly or indirectly" within the 1934 Act supports the thesis that
secondary liability is meant to be encompassed by such language.
65
The paucity of textual evidence, as well as the existence of specific
"aiding and abetting" language and liability elsewhere in the United
States Code, prompted the Court to conclude that "Congress knew
how to impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so,"
and that in the case of section 10(b), it did not so choose.66 The
Court then reiterated its holding in Santa Fe Industries v. Green67
that section 10(b) enjoins only the "making of a material misstatement
(or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act."'
Perhaps in recognition of the sweeping nature of its conclusion,
the Court then set forth alternative rationales for the holding.
Borrowing from a case it decided the previous term, Musick, Peeler
61. Id. at 1447; see supra note 12 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988)).
62. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988), where
the Court determined the meaning of the word "seller" in § 12(1) of the 1934 Act by
"look[ing] first at the language of the statute" and rejected appeals to consider a broader
definition derived from tort law).
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Brief for Respondents at 15, Central Bank (No. 92-854), which
advocates that "[i]nclusion of those who act 'indirectly' suggests a legislative purpose fully
consistent with the prohibition of aiding and abetting," and from Brief for SEC as Amicus
Curiae at 8, Central Bank (No. 92-854), stating that "we think that when read in context
[§ 10(b)] is broad enough to encompass liability for such indirect violations").
65. Id. at 1447-48 (citing, inter alia, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f)(2)(C)(1988) (direct or indirect
ownership of stock) and 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b)(2)-(3) (1988) (direct or indirect interest in put,
call, straddle, option, or privilege)).
66. Id. at 1448.
67. 430 U.S. 462 (1977)
68. Id.
1246 [Vol. 73
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& Garrett v. Employers Insurance,69 the Court outlined the ap-
propriate methodology for analyzing section 10(b) issues not answered
clearly in the text. 0 Musick recognized that the primary textual
source is the legislation itself It also held, however, that because
section 10(b) does not expressly create a private right of action, courts
must sometimes necessarily infer "how the 1934 Congress would have
addressed the issue had the 10b-5 action been included as an express
provision in the 1934 Act."'" To do this the Court examined other
express causes of action in the Act, reasoning that, had the Seventy-
third Congress chosen to enact a private section 10(b) aiding and
abetting cause of action in 1934, it probably would have fashioned it
in a manner similar to other private rights of action found in the
Securities Acts.72 The majority found that other relevant statutes
provide explicit guidelines for culpable conduct and that none of the
express causes of action in the 1934 Act imposes liability on those
who aid and abet violations of the securities laws.
73
Justice Kennedy then addressed the "broad based notion of
congressional intent" argument put forth by both the respondent and
the SEC.74 He rejected the notion that Congress intended to incor-
porate, by implication, common law principles of aiding and abetting
into the 1934 Act.75 Rather, he noted, although Congress had
enacted a general federal criminal aiding and abetting statute,76 no
matching statute provides for civil liability.77 The majority viewed
this fact, along with the specific enactment of aiding and abetting
liability in other statutes,78 as supporting its holding that no such
liability should exist under section 10(b). The Court then rebuffed
both sides' arguments claiming the post-1934 actions and inaction of
the Congress for their cause.79 According to the Court, the mere
existence of "Congressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted
69. 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
70. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448.
71. Id. at 1447 (quoting Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089-90 (1993)).
72. Id. at 1449 (citation omitted).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1450.
75. Id.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
77. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1450.
78. Id. at 1451 (citing I.R.C. § 6701 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (governing aiding and
abetting liability); 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (1988) (granting an express private right of action
for aiding and abetting a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act)).
79. Id. at 1452-53.
1247
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statute," and thus "deserves little weight in the interpretive pro-
cess."
80
The Court next dismissed the SEC's policy-based arguments for
upholding aiding and abetting liability, again noting that the text and
structure of the 1934 Act must control its interpretation of the statute,
except when such adherence would lead to a result "so bizarre that
Congress could not have intended it."81  The Court itself offered
several policy arguments against the existence of aiding and abetting
liability and, although conceding that there might also be reasonable
justifications for it, concluded that it is far from clear that Congress
in 1934 would have approved of the enactment of private aider and
abettor liability.' Finally, the Court rejected the SEC's argument
that the provisions in the securities law providing criminal sanctions
for aiding and abetting could be relied upon to provide a textual basis
for civil liability as well.'
The dissent, written by Justice Stevens,' rejected the majority's
treatment of the "long history of aider and abettor liability under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5" and warned that the Court's reasoning
would threaten the existence of other forms of secondary liability.85
The dissent presented significant evidence of the well-established
position of aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b).86
Addressing the Court's interpretive methodology, the dissent stated
that the approach of courts at the time of the passage of the 1934 Act
should control the Act's interpretation, and that such courts would
have construed section 10(b) broadly in light of the Act's remedial
purposes.' Justice Stevens argued that, even if the majority chose
80. Id. at 1453 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1
(1989)).
81. Id. at 1454 (quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)).
82. Id. The Court suggested that aider and abettor liability creates costs that "may
disserve the goals of fair dealing and efficiency in the securities markets." Id.
Furthermore, the court concluded that "the rules for determining aiding and abetting
liability are unclear," and that the possibility of aiding and abetting liability leads to "strike
suits" against professionals, many of whom might then increase the rates they charge to
their corporate clients, thus taking away from the company's investors, the ultimate
"intended beneficiaries of the statute." Id. The Court noted that favorable policy
arguments "can also be advanced," although it did not consider any in its opinion. Id.
83. Id. at 1454-55.
84. Id. at 1455 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg
joined Justice Stevens's dissent. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1456 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is a risk of anachronistic error in
applying our current approach to implied causes of action to a statute enacted when courts
1248 [Vol. 73
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to disregard the judicial bias toward the implication of remedies
prevalent at the time of the 1934 Act's enactment, the Court's own
precedent militated against upsetting the well-established judicial
creation of aiding and abetting liability, except by legislative action.'
According to the dissent, the Court's statement that "the text of the
1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid and abet a section 10(b)
violation" leaves no room for the existence of any federal right of
action against aiders and abettors, whether private or public.8 9
Furthermore, the statement throws into question the very existence
of the other forms of secondary liability upon which both the SEC
and the courts have long relied.' Judicial restraint, Justice Stevens
asserted, requires equal reticence when a court eliminates or creates
a cause of action.91
Although the Court's decision in Central Bank may at first seem
simply to be the result of the most natural and obvious manner of
statutory interpretation, an examination of the recent history of
securities regulation in America makes clear that the Central Bank
decision was by no means a sine qua non. The enactment of federal
securities legislation in the 1930s, coming on the heels of the most
spectacular economic disaster in the history of the United States, was
intended to promote an entirely new attitude toward the capital
markets; this attitude was to "add ... to the ancient rule of caveat
emptor, the further doctrine 'let the seller also beware.' [The latter
doctrine] puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller. It
should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring
back public confidence."'  Thus the policy of "full disclosure"'
commonly read statutes of this kind broadly to accord with their remedial purposes and
regularly approved rights to sue despite statutory silence.").
88. Id. at 1457-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[A] 'settled construction of an important
federal statute should not be disturbed unless and until Congress so decides.' ") (quoting
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74 (1990) (Stevens, 3., concurring)).
89. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1460.
90. Id. at 1460 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The first case to acknowledge the existence
of a private right of action under § 10(b) involved the implication of secondary liability,
namely the right of a private plaintiff to bring a conspiracy action under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The
dissent supposed that the Court's holding endangers such conspiracy liability. Central
Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1460 & n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Central Bank decision seems
to have had just such a chilling effect on SEC enforcement actions. See Christi Harlan,
SEC Voluntarily Dropping Charges in Certain Cases, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1994, at C15.
91. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1460 (Stevens, 3., dissenting).
92. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, quoted in 1 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURTIEs REGULATION 178-79 (3d ed. 1989) (citing S. REP. No. 47 at 6-7 and H.R. REP.
at 1-2, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933)).
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came to be embodied in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
To enforce this policy, both Acts contain explicit private rights of
action. The 1933 Act, which governs the initial sale of securities,
includes two sections creating actions that permit recovery of damages
for misrepresentation in connection with the sale of a security. 14
Furthermore, the 1933 Act contains a general antifraud provision that
does not explicitly create a private right of action. 5 Unlike the 1933
Act, which only safeguards buyers, the 1934 Act protects both
purchasers and purveyors of securities. The anti-fraud provision of
the 1934 Act is found in section 10(b), which makes it unlawful to
"use or employ... in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security... any manipulative or deceptive device ... in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission may prescribe."96 In 1942 the SEC promulgated Rule
10b-5,9 mimicking to a great degree the anti-fraud provision of the
1933 Act, section 17(a). Although its promulgation appears to have
been the impromptu result of a need to patch a hole in the existing
regulations," Rule 10b-5 has become one of the most potent
weapons in the SEC anti-fraud arsenal.
It is well accepted that one who aids another in the violation of
93. Louis Brandeis, later Associate Justice Brandeis of the United States Supreme
Court, wrote eloquently in favor of adequate disclosure of information in OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY passim (Frederick A. Stokes Co. 1932) (1914). "Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman." Id. at 92.
94. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2) (1988)).
See generally HAZEN, supra note 4, at §§ 7.2-7.5 (surveying aspects of civil liability for
misstatements by sellers of securities under the 1933 Act).
95. Securities Act of 1933 (codified at § 17(a); 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988)). Some
courts have implied a private remedy from § 17(a). See Thomas L. Hazen, A Look
Beyond the Pruning of Rule 10b-5: Implied Remedies and Section 17(a) of The Securities
Act of 1933, 64 VA. L. REv. 641 (1978).
96. For an excerpt of the pertinent parts of the statute, see supra note 12.
97. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994); see also supra note 38 (giving text of Rule 10b-5).
98. Milton Freeman described the birth of Rule 10b-5 as follows:
I went to work one day in May, 1942, and I did my normal job as an Assistant
Solicitor of the SEC. Somebody called me and said there is something wrong
going on in Boston (a company president was buying in shares from his own
shareholders without telling them of much improved earnings). He asked what
we could do about it. I wasted no time; I got some people in, we drafted a rule,
we presented it to the Commission, and, without any hesitation, the Commission
tossed the paper on the table saying they were in favor of it. One Commission
member said, "Well, we're against fraud, aren't we?" So, before the sun was
down, we had the rule that is now Rule 10b-5.
Milton V. Freeman, Foreword, Colloquium, Happy Birthday 10b-5: 50 Years of Antifraud
Regulation, 61 FoRDHAM L. REV., May 1993, at S1 (1993).
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civil or criminal laws often will have to answer not only for the act of
rendering such assistance, but also for any harm arising from the
resultant wrongdoing.' The use of the aiding and abetting action in
the securities field is especially fruitful, as it provides for joint and
several liability amongst all defendants, and so permits plaintiffs to
increase their chances of recovering any money damages they might
be awarded."°  Aiding and abetting liability did not, however,
spring full grown into the law of securities regulation, but rather grew
over time, along with other forms of relief implied under Rule 10b-5.
Its history, then, is necessarily intertwined with that of other doctrines.
As the Court noted in Central Bank, neither the language of
section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 creates a private right of action. 1'
Nonetheless, within four years of Rule 10b-5's promulgation, a federal
court upheld the existence of a private remedy under Rule lOb-5 for
stockholders seeking damages arising out of an alleged fraudulent
conspiracy in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.'" Notwithstanding
the absence of any statutory provision for a private action, "[t]he
disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort,"
and so the existence of a right was found to require the recognition
of a remedy.0 The Kardon court's allusion to the existence of a
"general law" indicates that Rule 10b-5, rather than itself inspiring an
implied right of action, may simply have been the beneficiary of the
99. Dean Prosser explained the principle of aider-abetter liability as follows:
All those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious
act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend
aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt the wrongdoer's acts
done for their benefit, are equally liable.
W. PROSSER AND W. PAGE KEETON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, at 323
(5th ed. 1984)(footnotes omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 876(b),
877 (1979) (mandating liability for persons who commit torts in concert or by directing or
permitting the conduct of another).
100. See David S. Ruder, The Future of Aiding and Abetting and Rule 10b-5 After
Central Bank of Denver, 49 Bus. LAW. 1479, 1482 n. 21 (1994) ("[P]rimary wrongdoers
often do not have sufficient funds to cover the claims against them."); see also Note,
Liability for Aiding and Abetting Violations of Rule 10b-5: The Recklessness Standard in
Civil Damages Actions, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1087, 1088-89 (1984) ("Because the primary
wrongdoer often is insolvent or bankrupt when the fraud is discovered, plaintiffs typically
sue all of the parties connected with a transaction, even when the connection is highly
attenuated, in search of a 'deep pocket.' ") (footnotes omitted).
101. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446 (1994).
102. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
103. Id. at 514. ("[IThe mere omission of an express provision for civil liability is not
sufficient to negative what the general law implies.").
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judge's belief in the need for a remedy." Nonetheless, Kardon is
generally recognized as the first significant use of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 to imply a private remedy.0 5
The earliest aiding and abetting actions were brought, not
privately, but by the SEC in civil enforcement actions."6 These
cases show the courts analogizing civil aiding and abetting liability to
tort law and also to criminal fraud." 7 Among the early private
action cases,"8 Brennan v. Midwestern Life Insurance Co."0 9 has
been the most influential. In Brennan, stockholders brought a
class-action suit against a corporation for its failure to report the
violations of a brokerage house that later went bankrupt. The
brokerage took money paid for the purpose of purchasing defen-
dant-corporation's stock and used it instead for speculation on its own
account."10 It also used fraudulent means to explain the delay in its
delivery of certain stock."' The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant
corporation had violated Rule 10b-5 by permitting the fraudulent
activities of the brokerage to continue, and that the corporation was
motivated by hopes that the brokerage's artificial inflation of the
market for its stock would have a favorable impact on the price of its
stock."2  The corporation moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, arguing that an aider and abettor could not be civilly liable
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.1" The Brennan court ack-
nowledged the principle of civil liability under Rule 10b-5 as estab-
lished in "the landmark case" of Kardon,"4 and discussed numerous
104. John A. Maher, Implied Private Rights of Action and the Federal Securities Laws:
A Historical Perspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 783, 792 (1980).
105. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 15.01, at 15-2
to 15-3 (1993).
106. See, e.g., In re Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C. 652 (1961); In re Southeastern
Sec. Corp., 29 S.E.C. 609 (1949).
107. See, e.g., SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1939). The court
described the injunction sought by the SEC under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act as "sound[ing]
in fraud, and... similar in many respects to a criminal prosecution." Id. at 43.
108. See, e.g., Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (suit
by corporate reorganization trustee against stock exchange, dealers, and others alleging
conspiracy that resulted in fraudulent distribution of corporate stock to the public).
109. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970).
110. Id. at 675.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 675-76.
114. Id. at 676 (citing Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946)). The court noted that "[d]efendant concedes that the complaint sufficiently alleges
a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by Dobich Securities Corporation. Nor has
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other cases confronting the issue of aider and abettor liability and
Rule 10b-5." 5 The court's most important contribution, however,
was its use of the Restatement of Torts provision governing the
liability of those giving knowing assistance to a fraudulent scheme."
6
According to the Brennan court, the principles "formulated in the
Restatement of Torts surely best fulfill the purposes of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and are a logical and natural complement to
the Kardon doctrine."" 7 Unlike the Central Bank Court, the
Brennan court clearly saw the purpose of the Act as being relevant to
its interpretation of the statute, and thus did not read section 10(b) as
excluding aiding and abetting."'
Because liability under 10b-5 had been implied by the judiciary
rather than expressly provided for in the statute, courts had to flesh
out the elements of the aiding and abetting cause of action on their
own." 9 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, clearly showing the
the defendant challenged the proposition that civil liability for damages arises under the
cited section and rule." Id.
115. I. at 676-77. The Court listed the following cases in Brennan as approving of
aider-abettor liability (in order of discussion): SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D.
Cal. 1939); SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Fry v.
Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947); and Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F.
Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Id
116. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680. The 1939 Restatement recommends imposition of
secondary liability as follows:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a
person is liable if he...
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result
and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty
to a third person.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939).
117. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680.
118. Espousing a view of statutory interpretation clearly at odds with the Central Bank
result, the Brennan court stated that:
[A] statute with a broad and remedial purpose such as the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 should not easily be rendered impotent to deal with new and unique
situations within the scope of the evils intended to be eliminated. In the absence
of a clear legislative expression to the contrary, the statute must be flexibly
applied so as to implement its policies and purposes. In this regard, it cannot be
said that civil liability for damages, so well established under the... Act of 1934,
may never under any circumstances be imposed upon persons who do no more
than aid and abet a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Id. at 680-81.
119. One of the only aspects of a 10b-5 claim that the courts did not define entirely
by themselves was the requirement, codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that
all fraud claims must be pleaded with particularity. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see also HAZEN,
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influence of Brennan, attempted to formulate definitively the elements
of an aiding and abetting cause of action under Rule 10b-5:
[A] person may be held as an aider and abettor only if some
other person has committed a securities law violation, if the
accused party has a general awareness that his role was part
of an overall activity that is improper, and if the accused
aider-abettor knowingly and substantially assisted the
violation. 2 °
To establish liability for aiding and abetting, a plaintiff first had
to show that a violation 2 ' of a provision of the federal securities
laws had occurred. This required a plaintiff initially to prove the cus-
tomary elements of a civil claim under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5." The alleged primary violator had to be identified so that
the court could determine which parties potentially were liable for
aiding and abetting."2 Failure to show a primary violation neces-
supra note 4, § 13.2.1, at 66 (examining interaction of particularity requirement and 10b-5
claims).
120. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975). This test had been adopted by all federal circuit courts of appeal. See, e.g., Farlow
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th Cir. 1992); Schatz v. Rosenberg,
943 F.2d 485, 495 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992); D.C.D. Programs,
Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 188 (9th Cir. 1987); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297,303
(6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800
F.2d 1040, 1045 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987); Barker v. Henderson,
Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th. Cir. 1986); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d
621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700
F.2d 774, 776-77 (1st Cir. 1983); Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 119 (2d
Cir. 1982); Dirks v. S.E.C., 681 F.2d 824, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 463
U.S. 646 (1983); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84,
96 (5th Cir. 1975).
121. See supra note 16 (distinguishing between primary and secondary violator).
122. The elements of a 10b-5 private cause of action include:
a misrepresentation or omission or other fraudulent device, the plaintiff's
purchase or sale of securities in connection with the fraudulent device, the
materiality of the misrepresentation or omission, the defendant's scienter in
making the representation or omission, the plaintiff's justifiable reliance on the
device (or due diligence against it), and the plaintiff's damages resulting from the
fraudulent device.
Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of Am., Inc., 608 F.2d 187, 193-94 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated
in part on other grounds on reh'g, 611 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Lampf v.
Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 377-78 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing elements of
10(b) action as "a false or misleading statement or material omission.., reliance thereon
... damages caused by the wrongdoing ... and scienter on the part of the defendant"
(citations omitted)).
123. Ruder, supra note 39, at 630 ("[E]xact identification... is essential in order to
determine which persons should be subject to liability for giving knowing assistance to...
the primary participants in the wrongdoing.").
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sarily meant that there could be no secondary violation. 24
The knowledge element had been, at least prior to the Central
Bank decision, the most troublesome aspect of 10b-5 aiding and
abetting liability. The Sixth Circuit's decision in SEC v. Coffey"z
required the defendant to have a general awareness that his role was
part of an improper overall activity.Y Other courts suggested that
knowledge could be shown by circumstantial evidence or by reckless
conduct. 27 Many, if not a majority, required that actual knowledge
or intent to aid be shown."n
One decision held that important considerations in determining
whether the knowledge requirement had been met included the type
of transaction at issue, the kind of security involved, and the existence
of any duties owed by the defendant arising out of the transaction or
their relationship with the plaintif 129 Adding to the level of
complexity then surrounding the knowledge requirement, in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder30 the Supreme Court required actions under
Rule 10b-5 to allege "scienter.""' As a result, the knowledge re-
quirement articulated in Coffey was merged into, and perhaps
subsumed by, this scienter requirement. The majority of courts prior
124. See, e.g., Stone v. Mehlberg, 728 F. Supp. 1341, 1355 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (aiding
and abetting complaint dismissed with prejudice for failure to substantiate primary
violation).
125. 493 F.2d 1304,1314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975) (holding that
knowing omission of material facts in corporate financial statement was sufficient to
establish violation of 10(b) and other securities laws).
126. Id. at 1316.
127. See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975); Kahn v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 760 F. Supp. 369,374 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (requiring only recklessness
when defendant owes fiduciary duty to plaintiff; otherwise, must show that assistance was
substantial, and was rendered knowingly).
128. HAZEN, supra note 4, §13.16, at 203.
129. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 95-97. Perhaps the most frequently cited portion of the
Woodward decision is the court's statement that "[i]f the evidence shows no more than
transactions constituting the daily grist of the mill, we would be loath to find 10b-5 liability
without clear proof of intent to violate the securities laws." Id. at 97.
130. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
131. Id. at 193. The Court in Hochfelder held that the statute virtually called out for
a scienter requirement because "[t]he words 'manipulative or deceptive' used in
conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended to
proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct." Id. at 197. The term "scienter" has been
subject of much discussion but little resolution; "[i]t has been said that the word 'scienter'
is not a word of mystery or magic meaning, but is merely an expressive word ... signifying
... that the alleged crime or tort was done designedly, understandingly, knowingly, or with
guilty knowledge." 79 CJ.S. Scienter (1952). Scienter is further defined, somewhat
elliptically, as "such knowledge as charges a person with the consequences of his acts."
37 CJ.S. Fraud § 19 (1943).
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to Central Bank had recognized reckless disregard of the truth as a
sufficient level of scienter in 10b-5 actions," and whether reckless-
ness would suffice as scienter was one of the issues originally appealed
to the Court in Central Bank." Despite some consistency,
however, the level of guilty knowledge sufficient to establish liability
was often simply a fact-specific determination."
The Coffey test for aiding and abetting liability required that the
defendant "knowingly and substantially assist[" in the fraud.'35
Courts noted the relationship of the knowledge and assistance prongs
of the liability test,'36 and decisions seemed to turn on a
case-by-case determination. One court defined substantiality as
"more than just a little [assistance]"; 37 another court held that a
simple "but for" showing of causation failed the substantial assistance
requirement.38  Plaintiffs were generally required to prove
proximate cause, namely that "[plaintiff's] injury was.., a direct or
reasonably foreseeable result of the [aider and abettor's] con-
duct.',139  In fleshing out the substantial assistance requirement,
some courts found guidance in section 876 of the Restatement of
Torts,"4 which listed some factors to be weighed in determining
132. See HAZEN, supra note 4, § 13.4, at 82-83 & n.15 (surveying holdings of federal
courts with regard to the definition of scienter and the level of scienter required in various
factual circumstances).
133. Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Defendant-Appellant at 10, Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (No. 92-854).
134. The uncertainty surrounding the scienter requirement prompted one commentator
to remark: "Probably the most important step toward clarifying the law of scienter would
be to ban the word." 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 8.4 (503) (1971).
135. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975).
136. See, e.g., Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621,624 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1057 (1986) ("[Knowledge and substantial assistance should not be] considered in isolation
.. . [because] they vary inversely relative to one another and . . . [if] evidence of
substantial assistance is slim, the requirement of knowledge or scienter is enhanced accor-
dingly."); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (1975) ("The scienter requirement
scales upward when [fraud] is more remote.").
137. Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,495 (7th Cir. 1986)
(citation omitted).
138. The Limited, Inc. v. McCrory Corp., 683 F. Supp. 387, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(" 'But for' causation does not satisfy the substantial assistance requirement.").
139. See Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 63 (2d Cir.
1985).
140. See, e.g., Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978) ("The Restatement ... [requires us] to. consider the
following factors in determining whether a defendant's conduct constitutes substantial
assistance: (1) the amount of assistance given by the defendant, (2) his presence or absence
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whether any assistance rendered amounted to substantial assis-
tance.14'
Since Marbury v. Madison,'42 the scope of the United States
Supreme Court's power to interpret Congressional statutes has been
perhaps the most controversial arrow in the jurisprudential quiver of
the High Bench.43 The interpretive principles consistently ad-
vocated by the Court bear reviewing, as doing so brings to light how
the Central Bank decision ignores or rejects many traditional precepts
of statutory interpretation, while at the same time continuing the
Court's ambivalent attitude toward implied securities actions.
First and foremost, as the Central Bank majority made clear, the
Court has looked to the words of the statute it is interpreting to
divine the intent of the legislature.' 4 For a statute to have caused
a dispute significant enough to reach the Supreme Court, however, it
is unlikely that the words alone are sufficient to explicate the statute's
at the time of the tort, (3) his relation to the other person, and (4) his state of mind.").
Section 876 of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS was incorporated into RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS (1979) as § 436.
141. Of special interest, in light of the facts underlying the Central Bank case, was the
question of whether inaction constitutes "substantial assistance." Most of the prior
decisions turned on whether or not there was an independent duty of disclosure, in which
case silence appeared sufficient to create aiding and abetting liability. See Walck V.
American Stock Exch., Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 791 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding inaction insufficient
to cause liability), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983); Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo
Securities Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045
(1980) (holding that absent an independent duty, silence is not sufficient to impose aiding
and abetting liability). Even absent a duty to speak, silence could create aider and abettor
liability if the defendant intended to promote the primary violation. See Cleary v. Perfec-
tune, 700 F.2d 774, 778 (1st Cir. 1983).
142. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
143. See generally ARTHUR S. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL AcrIvIsM
(1982) (a history of judicial activism); HORACE H. READ ET AL., MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION (3d ed. 1973) (textbook surveying role of legislation as an instrument of
change and innovation in law); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncian
Explorers: Twentieth-Century Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, 61 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 1731 (1993) (examining, as a "microcosm of this century's debates over the proper
way to interpret statutes," the statutory interpretations offered by the Justices in Lon
Fuller's landmark hypothetical, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV.
616 (1949)); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) (canvassing implications of recent congressional action
taken in response to Supreme Court statutory construction); David L. Shapiro, Continuity
and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921, 925-26 (1992) (surveying
and endorsing traditional canons of statutory interpretation); A Symposium on Statutory
Construction, 3 VAND. L. REv. 365 (1950) (surveying the methodology and rationales of
statutory interpretation).
144. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447-48; see also, e.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) ("[tlhe intention of the law maker must govern in the
construction of ... statutes.").
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meaning. The Court has thus acknowledged that it must view the
words within the context of the legislation as a whole and in light of
the purpose that the legislation was meant to serve.1 45 Two corol-
lary rules of interpretation follow: "A thing may be within the letter
of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers";146 and "a thing may
be ... within [a statute's meaning] though not within its terms.
147
Clearly, then, these interpretive rules can, with nothing but judicial
imagination to constrain them, give the Court a wide power to
theorize as to the "intent" underlying the legislation at issue.
Traditionally, however, the Court has considered numerous other
factors when interpreting statutes, all aimed at discerning the wish of
Congress, and thereby circumscribing what might otherwise be viewed
as the Court's unfettered power of interpretation."4  Such con-
siderations include examining any records charting the legislation's
development-the so-called "legislative history"' 49 -and can extend
to considerations of what provisions the Congress incorporated into
a bill, as well as those it chose not to incorporate.50 Also
traditionally bearing on the Court's interpretation of a statute is the
interpretation given that statute by the administrative agency charged
with its enforcement' and the Congress's acquiescence in the ad-
ministrative interpretation. 2 Long established, too, is the practice
145. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979); accord
United States National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents, 113 S. Ct. 2173,2182
(1993).
146. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (quoting
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)).
147. Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291, 300 (1876).
148. What has been described as the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" created by the
quasi-legislative pronouncements of an unelected judicial elite is nicely surveyed in
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). Justice Antonin Scalia has said, "I think we have an
obligation to conduct our exegesis in a fashion which fosters th[e] democratic process."
United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 346 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
149. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974).
150. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186,200 (1974) (reasoning
that the deletion of a provision from bill in Conference Committee "strongly militates
against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to enact").
151. See, e.g., Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 113 S. Ct. 2151, 2159 (1993); Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381
(1969); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 345 (1932).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 136
(1985); see also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979) ("[O]nce an
agency's statutory construction has been 'fully brought to the attention of the public and
the Congress,' and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation although it has
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of referring not simply to legislative history, but also to the actual
historical circumstances underlying the enactment of the statute.
53
Section 10(b) does not explicitly provide for aiding and abetting
liability. 4 Nor, however, does it set forth a private right of action,
or a statute of limitations upon that action; yet section 10b-5's text has
not stopped the Court from acknowledging their existence.5 5 The
Court has long mandated that the 1934 Act, because of its stature as
"remedial legislation," must be construed broadly to effectuate its
purposes.'56 To that end the Court has permitted the implication of
private remedies for securities laws violations.157 Section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act was the subject of generous interpretation, because of
its statutory role as a "catch-all" clause to prevent fraudulent
securities practices.5 8
The implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5 has been
called a "judicial oak which has grown from little more than a
legislative acorn,"'59 and is generally thought to be responsible for
amended the statute in other respects, then presumably the legislative intent has been
correctly discerned." (citation omitted)).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962) ("[Sjtatutes are
construed by the courts with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of
passage."); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411 (1979); Preston
v. Browder, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 115, 120-21 (1816).
154. See supra note 12 (setting forth relevant statutory text).
155. See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's ack-
nowledgment of private remedy) and note 178 and accompanying text (discussing Court's
recognition of right of contribution).
156. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983);
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
157. Initially, the Court dictated in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), that a
remedy could be implied when to do so was consistent with the intent of the legislature
and when such implied remedies aided in the SEC's enforcement efforts. Id. at 432-35
("[MFederal courts have the power to grant all necessary remedial relief. .. ."). In an
attempt to restrain the federal judiciary's imposition of remedies in the wake of Borak's
generous mandate, the Court held in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), that the implication
of federal remedies was to be governed by a four-fold test. Id at 78. The test called for
consideration of: (1) whether the plaintiff is a member of "the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted"; (2) whether there is any indication of a legislative intent,
"explicit or implicit," either to create or deny a remedy; (3) whether a private remedy
would be consistent with the overall legislative "scheme"; and (4) whether the cause of
action was "traditionally relegated" to state law. Id. This four-part test quickly became
distilled to focus on a single factor-the intent of Congress. See Texas Indus. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) ("Our focus ... is on the intent of Congress...
[which] may be discerned by looking into the legislative history and other factors: e.g., the
identity of the class for whom the statute was enacted, the overall legislative scheme, and
the traditional role of the states in providing relief.").
158. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (citation omitted).
159. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
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more securities litigation than any other section of the federal
securities laws. Early cases such as Kardon"60 relied on no single
theory of judicial implication, leaving Rule 10b-5 actions to grow
haphazardly in the federal courts; ultimately, the existence of a private
remedy received the sanction of the Supreme Court in Superintendent
of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. 6' Interestingly
enough, in Bankers Life, where the Court first explicitly recognized
and applied the 10b-5 doctrine, 62  the issue of statutory
interpretation was for the most part ignored. What little was said,
viewed in light of Central Bank, is somewhat astonishing; Justice
Douglas, delivering the opinion of a unanimous court, stated that
"section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restric-
tively."'
63
No sooner did the Court recognize the existence of the right of
action, however, than it began to limit its scope. In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,'" an accounting firm allegedly failed to conduct proper
audits of a brokerage firm engaged in a fraudulent scheme. The
Hochfelder Court explicitly reserved judgment as to whether the
aiding and abetting action was proper under the Rule;165 proper or
not, the Court in Hochfelder nonetheless took the opportunity to
circumscribe it, ruling that simple negligence would not suffice to
fulfill the scienter requirement of the aiding and abetting action.
66
Moreover, the Court pronounced that "the existence of a private
cause of action for violations of [section 10(b)] and [Rule 10b-5] is
now well established."'167 This language falls ironically alongside the
statement that "the starting point in every case involving construction
of a statute is the language [of the statute] itself."'"
The implied remedies available under Rule 10b-5 continued to
appear before the Court, and generally the Court was willing to treat
160. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
161. 404 U.S. 6 (1970).
162. Id. at 13 n.9 ("It is now established that a private right of action is implied under
§ 10(b).").
163. Id. at 12. The two Banker's Life Justices still sitting at the time of Central Bank,
now-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun, no longer agreed in their view of
§ 10(b), and signed on to different sides of the latter decision.
164. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Decided the term after Cort, Hochfelder gave the Court a
fresh opportunity to address the rights available under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
165. Id. at 192 n.7.
166. In so ruling, of course, the Court helped contribute to the muddle surrounding
scienter. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
167. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 196.
168. Id. at 197.
1260 [Vol. 73
1995] SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 10(b) 1261
them with interpretive generosity.'69 In Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston,"70 the Court ruled that the implied remedy under
section 10(b) was cumulative, meaning that claims could be brought
under Rule 10b-5 in addition to any action brought under an explicit
statutory authorization. 171 The Court again reiterated the impor-
tance of permitting an expansive interpretation of the securities
statutes, in furtherance of the Acts' "broad remedial purposes."'7
In Lampf Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,73
the Court held that an action brought under the section 10(b) implied
right must be commenced within one year after discovery of the
violation and within no more than three years after the violation
occurs.'74 This holding departed from the normal rule that provides
for the "borrowing" of the relevant state statute of limitations when
Congress fails to provide one explicitly. In reaching its decision, the
Supreme Court employed a new interpretive tool, seeking to infer
how the Congress that enacted the 1934 Act would have addressed
the statute of limitations problem if it had included an express 10b-5
private right of action in the Act. 7 Aware of the "awkward task"
it faced, the Court looked toward analogous remedies within the same
legislation, and asked how they dealt with the statute of limitations
problem. Sections 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act, governing the willful
manipulation of security prices and the filing of misleading
registration statements, respectively, were found to be sufficiently
analogous to the 10(b) fraud action that the congressionally enacted
statutes of limitations govern any 10b-5 action. 76 Other recent
cases involving the securities laws have also shown some willingness
169. The Court's treatment of 10b-5 implied remedies was not uniformly expansive.
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,473-74 (1977) (holding that behavior
neither manipulative nor deceptive does not fall within the ambit of 10b-5 regulation and
indicating that to hold otherwise would incorporate into federal regulation matters
traditionally governed by the states).
170. 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
171. Id. at 387. So exuberant was the Court in Huddleston that it declared that "the
existence of this [10b-5] implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure." Id. at 380.
172. Id. at 386.
173. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
174. Id at 364.
175. Id. at 359.
176. More recently, the Court recognized a right to contribution as an element of the
10b-5 cause of action, employing the same sort of "legislative symmetry" or "putative
intent" analysis employed in Lampf. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S.
Ct. 2085, 2090 (1993).
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to recognize implied rights.'77
Clearly, then, the United States Supreme Court has not shied
away from operating outside the literal constraints of a statute. As
recently as the 1993 term, having freely extended the 10b-5 action to
include a right of contribution, 78 the Court recognized in Musick
that, " 'where a legal structure of private statutory rights has
developed without clear indications of congressional intent,' a federal
court has the limited power to define 'the contours of that struc-
ture.' ,,79 This notion carried forward the Court's earlier
philosophy of reading the securities laws broadly to accomplish the
remedial purposes of the statutes.'8
In order to sidestep its long history of generous statutory
interpretation, the Court in Central Bank first sought to divide its
precedent between those cases addressing the "scope of conduct
prohibited by § 10(b)" and those presenting questions about the
"elements of the 10b-5 private liability action."18' Yet this dis-
tinction is not a particularly meaningful one.112 In Musick, the
Court acknowledged that a right of contribution was normally
"thought to be a separate or independent right of action."1 83  If
contribution is a separate right of action, then it could hardly be
described, as the Court in Central Bank sought to, as an "element" of
another cause of action; the Court's initial distinction does not in fact
draw any salient precedential line.
The Central Bank majority, having set forth the dichotomy
between "scope" and "elements," then stated its interpretive credo:
177. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 388
(1982) (recognizing an implied remedy under the Commodity Exchange Act). But cf.
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571 (1979) (denying existence of an
implied private right of action under § 17(a) of the 1934 Act).
178. Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993). See
Christopher R. Stone, Note, Implying a Right of Contribution under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5: The Supreme Court Finds Power Where
None Exists, 35 B.C. L. REv. 175 (1993) (criticizing particularly the Court's decision in
Musick, and more generally the perceived leniency in the implication of private remedies).
179. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089 (quoting Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 111 S.
Ct. 2749, 2764 (1991)); see also infra note 186 and accompanying text (noting the Court's
statement in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975)).
180. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 (1983).
181. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1445.
182. Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank, 49 Bus. LAW. 1429,1431 (1994)
("This is a troublesome distinction to credit.... Virtually no lower court had drawn this
distinction in the section 10(b) aiding and abetting context.").
183. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2088.
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"[T]he text of the statute controls our decision."'") While this is a
fair statement of elementary statutory interpretation, the Court's prior
decisions, especially those treating section 10(b), have not made
statutory text the sole source of interpretive guidance. The statute in
10(b) cases has been, at best, a mere starting point in the statutory
construction; 8s the Court had recognized that the 10(b) action,
being a judicial creation, necessarily required courts to "flesh out the
portions of the law with respect to which neither the congressional
enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive
guidance."'86 In the case of section 10(b), as the Court itself has
remarked, the language of the statute is no place to look for
guidance."
The Central Bank majority cites cases proving that its strictly
textualist creed is consistent with its treatment of section 10(b) and
other provisions of the securities acts." As the dissent points out,
however, "none of the[se] cases.., even arguably involved a settled
course of lower court opinions."'89 In the case of a statute subject
to a single, well-established judicial reading, the Court has made clear
that "settled construction of an important federal statute should not
be disturbed unless and until Congress so decides."'" Although
presented with significant evidence that the Congress had in fact
184. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1446. The rationale given by the Court has not
convinced all commentators. See, e.g., Seligman, supra note 182, at 1432 (describing
Court's reasoning as a "legal fiction").
185. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976) (noting that statutory
language is the "starting point in every case involving construction of a statute"); cf.
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983) (advocating broad reading
of the provisions of section 10(b) in order to further "remedial purposes" of securities
laws).
186. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). As recently
as Musick, the Court recognized the existence of judicial power to delineate "the contours
of [an implied right's] structure." Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2089 (citation omitted).
187. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2090 ("The text of § 10(b) provides little guidance where
we are asked to specify elements or aspects of the 10b-5 apparatus." (citation omitted)).
188. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1445-47 (citing, inter alia, Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622,
641 (1988) (holding that text of securities Acts governed judicial determination of a word's
meaning) and Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2067 (1993) (holding that
failure of ERISA to set forth explicitly a cause of action against a nonfiduciary for its
knowing participation in a breach of the fiduciary's duty barred Court's recognition of such
an action)).
189. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1459 n.6 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1458 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S.
56, 74 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
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acquiesced in the courts' interpretation of 10(b),' the majority in
Central Bank stuck to its textualist guns, via a footnote from a more
recent case: "Congressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted
statute.,,192
In its most recent previous encounter with section 10(b) the
Court recognized a right of contribution under the statute, noting that
neither federal courts nor the Securities and Exchange Commission
had "suggested that... [contribution interferes with] the effectiveness
of the 10b-5 implied action or ... the operation of the securities
laws."'" While both of these factors militate overwhelmingly in
favor of the recognition of aiding and abetting liabilityl'a-which has
a far longer and more significant judicial and administrative history
than the right to contribution-they clearly did not influence the
Court toward recognizing the aiding and abetting action.
The Court in Central Bank, as an alternative form of textual
analysis, sought to infer from other express causes of action in the
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 how the Seventy-third Congress
would have dealt with the issue of aiding and abetting liability.'
In doing so, the Court embraced an interpretive methodology it has
described as "not a promising venture as a general proposition."'96
Not finding any express statutes that provided for aiding and abetting
liability, the Court concluded that the 1934 Congress "would not have
attached aiding and abetting liability to § 10(b) had it provided a
private § 10(b) cause of action."' ' The Court's newly preferred
"putative-intent" analysis appears to represent an attempt to retain
parts of a well-respected interpretive method-namely, examining the
191. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Securities and Exchange Commission at 16,
Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994) (No. 92-854) (discussing various congressional
hearings concerning, and amendments of, the securities laws, which indicate that Congress
knew about, and approved of, the existence of implied aiding and abetting liability). The
SEC asserted that "[t]he House Report particularly 'endorsed the judicial application of
the concept of aiding and abetting liability to achieve the remedial purposes of the
securities laws.' " Id (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1983)).
192. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1453 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164,175 n.1 (1989)). Patterson dealt with employment-discrimination claims and thus
did not display the Court's traditional interpretive generosity when faced with securities
law issues. Patterson, 491 U.S., at 175.
193. Musick, 113 S. Ct. 2085, 2091 (1993).
194. See supra notes 106-41 and accompanying text (describing history of aiding and
abetting action); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting that 15% of the
SEC's 1992 civil enforcement actions contained claims of aiding and abetting).
195. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1448.
196. Musick, 113 S. Ct. at 2090.
197. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1449.
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legislation as whole-while gouging out the very aim of that tool,
which is to ascertain from the whole what purpose the legislation is
meant to serve. The words of the statute alone are not always
sufficient to truly illuminate the intent of Congress, and in light of the
1934 Act's clear purpose of promoting availability and exchange of
accurate information in securities transactions,'98 it hardly seems
sufficient for the Court to limit its interpretive analysis to a gram-
matical foray through the 1934 Act. Moreover, this conclusion
ignores both the Court's long acceptance of implied remedies and the
possibility that Congress (1) enacted the statute without any opinion
on aiding and abetting liability generally,' 99 or (2) simply assumed
the general availability of an aider and abettor action."°
What makes Central Bank most remarkable, however, is that it
is a judicial wolf in sheep's clothing, an act of extreme judicial
activism carried out while purporting to employ the strictest possible
interpretive means. To that extent, perhaps Central Bank can best be
viewed as a victory of the jurisprudential philosophy of Justice
Antonin Scalia, whose strict textualist views on statutory
interpretation virtually require both the methodology and the
outcome arrived at by the Court.2"' Central Bank certainly marks
the first occasion on which a majority of the Court has employed
Justice Scalia's method of statutory interpretation to tear down
decades of federal law. 2 Justice Scalia's methodology is premised
198. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385 (1990). Professor Thel argues that section 10(b) "was
intended to empower the Securities and Exchange Commission... to regulate any practice
that might contribute to speculation in securities or tend to move security prices away from
investment value." Iii at 385-86.
199. As the Court has noted, "the extensive legislative history of the 1934 Act is bereft
of any explicit explanation of Congress' intent." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 201 (1976).
200. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1456 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reviewing
turn-of-the-century prominence of aider-abettor liability).
201. See generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's
Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401 (1994)
(surveying Justice Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation); William D. Popkin, An
"Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV.
1133 (1992) (criticizing Justice Scalia's interpretive approach); Arthur Stock, Justice Scalia's
Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses,
1990 DUKE LJ. 160 (1990) (examining separation-of-powers problems, and others, created
by Justice Scalia's interpretive framework).
202. Justice Scalia's philosophy of textual interpretation has generally been voiced only
in concurring or dissenting opinions. Karkkainen, supra note 201 at 401. "Only Justices
Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas can be called adherents of Justice Scalia's plain
meaning approach. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor frequently join Justice
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
on an open hostility to the very basis upon which 10b-5 aiding and
abetting liability was built-the notion that a poorly expressed
congressional intent can be salvaged by the judiciary and wrought into
a workable and just remedy. Justice Scalia has been very clear: "The
principle of our democratic system is not that each legislature enacts
a purpose."2 3  Although Justice Scalia himself has wavered from
this position 2 -- and it might be a great disservice to Justice Ken-
nedy, as the author of the Central Bank opinion, to imply that he was
merely parroting Justice Scalia's interpretive line-the Central Bank
opinion's insistence on limiting any examination of the statute to the
statutory language0" in determining the existence of aiding and
abetting liability exemplifies the interpretive school identified with
Justice Scalia-what has been called the "new textualism. ' '20 6 Not
only did the Central Bank opinion not seek "outside help'.' from
notions of legislative intent, it also failed to consider the SEC's
acceptance and usage of the aiding and abetting cause of action.2 7
It thus went further than perhaps even Justice Scalia might have had
Scalia's opinions, but seldom rely on his approach in their own opinions." Id. As the
aforementioned Justices constitute the members of the Central Bank majority, Central
Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1442 (1994), it remains an open question as to whether Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor have "signed on" permanently to Scalia's interpretive
school, or whether their interpretive methodology will continue to differ when writing in
their own names.
203. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 325 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). Justice Scalia's influence and the shift away
from the use of legislative history and intent analysis in statutory interpretation are
highlighted in Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994). Merrill points out that in the Court's 1981 Term, it referred
to legislative history in determining every one of the statutory interpretation cases put
before them, while in the 1992 Term, they referred to legislative history in only 18% of
the cases involving the interpretation of a statute. Id. at 355.
204. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DuKE L.J. 511, 515 (1989) ("[I]t seems to me that the 'traditional tools of statutory
construction' include not merely text and legislative history but also, quite specifically, the
consideration of policy consequences.").
205. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1454 (refusing to examine policy considerations in
statutory interpretation except when they show that "adherence to the text and structure
would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could not have intended it." (citations
omitted)); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621,
623 (1990) (quoting from Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 452 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that use of legislative
history should be limited, and that "if the language of a statute is clear, that language must
be given effect-at least in the absence of a patent absurdity.")).
206. Eskridge, supra note 205, at 623.
207. See Scalia, supra note 204, at 518 (discussing weight given to administrative
interpretation).
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Furthermore, the Central Bank decision represents the flowering
of the jurisprudential seeds sown by Presidents Reagan and Bush.2"
Although the Court's dogmatic literalism is well suited to its
conservative label, the Court's Central Bank decision puts its
conservative reputation at risk, because, as Professor Archibald Cox
has noted, "[c]onstitutionalism as practiced in the past ... [cannot]
survive ift as the result of a succession of carefully chosen Presidential
appointments, the sentiment of a majority of the Justices shift[s] back
and forth at five- or ten-year intervals so that rights ... [are]
alternately recognized and denied."21 The doctrine of stare decisis,
although not absolute, must have some meaning if the decisions of the
Court are to be viewed as anything other than the results of simple
judicial caprice.
The Court's Central Bank decision seems to signal one of two
possibilities. Either Central Bank will stand as an "isolated deviation
from the strong current of precedents-a derelict on the waters of the
law,121' and will go on to be overruled by Congress or narrowly
applied by the lower courts, or it will mark the sure end of implied
secondary liability in the securities laws, and will threaten the
existence of many other judicially implied remedies. The Court's
decision has produced some immediate effects-the dismissal of both
private and SEC actions212 against alleged aiders and abettors, and
congressional action in the form of the introduction of a bill that
would reverse the Court's holding.1 3 In the short term, it is quite
208. For Justice Scalia's views supporting reference to administrative interpretation
when construing an ambiguous statute, see Scalia, supra note 204 passim. Of course, it can
be argued both that there is nothing ambiguous about the statute at issue, and alternatively
that every statute is ambiguous. Justices Stevens and Scalia argue illuminatingly about the
administrative agency's role in statutory interpretation in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,
467 U.S. 837 passim (1984). See also Merrill, supra note 203, at 355-73 (examining role
of deference to agency interpretation in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence).
209. Of the Justices deciding Central Bank, only Ruth Bader Ginsburg was appointed
by a Democratic President.
210. Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism or
Self-Restraint?, 47 MD. L. REv. 118, 137 (1987).
211. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
212. See Harlan, supra note 90, at C15.
213. S. 2306, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Senator Howard Metzenbaum, who
introduced this bill, expressed concern that "[u]nless the ... [Central Bank] decision is
reversed by Congress, most defrauded investors will not recover their losses because,
typically, the perpetrator of the fraud is insolvent by the time the case is filed or
completed." 140 CONG. REc. S9460 (daily ed. July 21, 1994) (statement of Sen. Metzen-
baum). While Senator Metzenbaum's bill seems to have expired with the end of the 103d
Congress, the Republican majority of the newly-elected 104th Congress has shown itself
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possible that some of the actions that have been dismissed will be
brought again as assertions of primary violations of section 10(b),214
something that will require the proof of additional elements to
establish liability.2 15 Plausible long-term effects of the decision
include the possibility of an undertaking by the Court to eliminate
other forms of implied liability. As the dissent warned, the majority's
rationale and methodology "imperil[] other well established forms of
secondary liability not expressly addressed in the securities laws. 2 16
It is not inconceivable that any implied right of action without an
explicit statutory analog could be erased? 7 Moreover, the decision
points the way toward a more conservative judicial interpretation of
federal statutes generally, which could lead to a corresponding
liberalization in the use of state securities laws as a means to shore up
inclined to legislate in a manner consistent with the Central Bank majority. The Common
Sense Legal Reform Act of 1995 includes a section, intended to prevent what it calls
"fishing expedition" lawsuits, that fixes an uniform heightened scienter standard for all §
10(b) actions. H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1995). Such a heightened standard
would probably have the effect of eliminating all Rule 10b-5 secondary liability claims
based on less than "knowing" participation in a fraud.
214. Often, both actions were brought against the same party. See, e.g., Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.5 (1983).
215. Traditional elements for a primary fraud violation of § 10(b) are: (1) the use of
an instrumentality of interstate commerce; (2) the making by the defendant of a material
misrepresentation or omission; (3) the intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud; (4)
reliance by the plaintiff on the defendant's misrepresentation; (5) causation; and (6)
damages flowing from the defendant's conduct. See, e.g., Weitzman v. Stein, 436 F. Supp.
895, 902-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Lisa Klein Wager & John E. Failla, Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.-The Beginning of an End, Or Will
Less Lead to More?, 49 Bus. LAW. 1451, 1456-61 (1994) (canvassing the difficulties
presented when seeking to establish primary liability instead of bringing aiding and
abetting actions).
216. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1456 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Federal courts have developed numerous remedies providing for secondary
liability. These include the common law doctrine of respondeat superior. See, e.g., Paul
F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980); Holloway
v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1976). Claims of a conspiracy to violate section
10(b) can also be alleged, but unlike aiding and abetting liability, they generally require
levels of knowledge and participation closer to that required of a primary violator.
Compare Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (acknowledging that
court may find a tacit agreement sufficient to impose consspiracy liability) with Weitzman
v. Stein, 436 F. Supp. 895, 902-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (requiring knowing agreement to, and
participation in, a scheme to defraud in order to impose conspiracy liability). Like aiding
and abetting liability, neither respondeat superior nor conspiracy have any basis in the
statutory text. Recovery under theories of "controlling person liability," a statutorily based
method of expanding liability for securities fraud, has also been suggested as a possible
means of replacing aiding and abetting liability, although one fraught with significant dif-
ficulties. See Wager & Failla, supra note 215, at 1463-65.
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the damage done by the Central Bank decision.218
The section 10(b) private liability doctrine, to be sure, was a
judicial creation. Its long history, however, shows that the courts
carefully guided its growth, keeping foremost in their collective minds
that, for the securities laws to have any meaning, they must provide
adequate remedies for the rights they seek to protect. Part of this
judicial trend was the recognition of aiding and abetting liability under
Rule 10b-5, a cause of action well suited for policing the gray
periphery of securities law enforcement; otherwise liability might not
attach to those lawyers, bankers and accountants who claim simply
"all I did was the paperwork," notwithstanding their knowledge of
how that paperwork would be put to use. Following the practice
begun in Hochfelder, in Central Bank the Court began to chop away
at the mighty oak that has grown from the legislative acorn of section
10(b). Although this is a proper use of the Court's power, if it fails
to respect precedent and consistency in interpretation, the Court may
find itself unable to control the direction in which the tree falls.
GLEN WALLACE ROBERTS II
218. Many states have acknowledged the existence of aiding and abetting liability,
either implied or explicit, under their respective state securities regulations. See, e.g., Bayhi
v. State, 629 So. 2d 782,792 (Ala. 1993); State v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 599
P.2d 777, 784 (Ariz. 1979) (en banc); Foley v. Allard, 427 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Minn. 1988).

